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This paper studies separation payments made when CEOs leave their firms.  In a sample of 179
exiting Fortune 500 CEOs, more than half receive severance pay and the mean separation
package is worth $5.4 million.  The large majority of severance pay is awarded on a
discretionary basis by the board of directors and not according to terms of an employment
agreement.  For the subset of exiting CEOs who are dismissed, separation pay generally
conforms to theories related to bonding and damage control.  Shareholders react negatively when
separation agreements are disclosed, but only in cases of voluntary CEO turnover.
JEL classification codes: G34, J33
I appreciate helpful comments from John Core, Eliezer Fich, Kose John, Holger Mueller,
Tjomme Rusticus, Douglas Skinner, Rangarajan Sundaram, Jeffrey Wurgler, an anonymous
referee, and seminar participants at the University of Arizona, Binghamton University, the
University of Iowa, New York University, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the National
Bureau of Economic Research, and the Swedish Institute for Financial Research.1 For example, in June 2000 Procter & Gamble Co. ousted Chairman and CEO Durk I. Jager, age 57, who in a
brief tenure of 18 months had presided over a sizeable drop in P&G’s stock price.  P&G paid $9.5 million to Jager in
exchange for future consulting services and a promise not to compete, citing his “loyal and distinguished service” and
“arrangements provided by other companies to retiring chief executive officers.”  Jager also retained his previously
awarded  pension and stock options.  A shareholder resolution at the company’s next annual meeting assailed the package
as “obscene” and proposed a ban on future severance pacts.
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Golden Handshakes:
Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs
1. Introduction
This paper studies “golden handshakes,” the colloquial name for separation packages
awarded to CEOs at retirement or termination.  These severance agreements, somewhat similar
to “golden parachutes” received by CEOs whose firms are acquired, can lead to controversy
between shareholders and boards of directors.
1  Because separation pay occurs when a CEO exits
the firm, critics assert that it represents a giveaway that cannot influence future performance and
may indicate broader governance problems.  However, counter-arguments suggest that
separation pay may be part of an efficient multi-period incentive contract.  For successful CEOs,
a separation package could represent the payoff from an “ex post settling up” implicit contract
(Fama, 1980), under which a board of directors assesses a CEO’s achievements at the end of his
career and compensates him accordingly.  For CEOs who fail, severance compensation might be
predicted by one or more related bonding theories.  In these models, contingent severance pay is
promised in advance to managers, providing insurance for their human capital value.  CEOs are2 The classic study of golden parachutes is Lambert and Larcker (1985), and a more recent treatment is
Lefanowicz, Robinson, and Smith (2000).  The relation between golden parachutes and other target CEO gains from
acquisitions is investigated by Agrawal and Knoeber (1998) and Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004).
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thereby encouraged to take risk (Almazan and Suarez, 2003) and discouraged from concealing
adverse information (Inderst and Mueller, 2005), entrenching themselves in office (Almazan and
Suarez, 2003), or shirking when their dismissal appears possible (Berkovitch, Israel, and Spiegel,
2000).  Under a separate theory, separation pay may serve as an instrument of damage control
when CEOs are ousted, helping the board protect corporate secrets and head off litigation or
adverse publicity.
Although golden parachutes have been investigated at length by researchers,
2 no study
has studied separation agreements for CEOs who retire or get dismissed by their boards.  This
paper examines a data set of 179 CEOs of Fortune 500 CEOs who leave their firms between
1996 and 2002.  I gather data about the terms of each CEO’s departure and classify separation
pay into five categories.  More than half of the CEOs in the sample collect compensation upon
leaving their position, with a mean present value of $5.4 million including the zero-valued
observations.  Nineteen of the 179 sample CEOs receive packages with present values exceeding
$10 million.  However, in most cases separation pay appears modest, as the mean package equals
0.06 percent of the average market capitalization of sample firms and is less than the value of
one year’s average CEO compensation.
Though their value is not dramatic relative to certain benchmarks, separation packages
represent a puzzle because firms usually are not required to pay them.  The large majority of
separation pay in my sample – 83 percent – is not delivered pursuant to existing employment
contracts but instead is granted to CEOs on a discretionary basis by their boards of directors. 3
CEOs who are dismissed are far more likely to obtain separation pay compared to CEOs who
retire voluntarily (91 percent vs. 47 percent), and their awards are several times larger, with a
mean value of $15.1 million (median $6.5 million) compared to a mean of $2.3 (median zero) in
cases of normal retirements.  Dismissed CEOs also obtain the large majority of their separation
pay – 76 percent – from discretionary awards rather than existing employment contracts.
For insight into why firms award severance pay, I estimate a regression model based
upon the ex post settling up, bonding, and damage control theories referred to above, and an
additional theory related to managerial rent extraction (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  I also analyze
stock market returns upon disclosure of CEOs’ exit packages.  For the subsample of CEOs who
retire voluntarily, regression analysis fails to support either the ex post settling up or rent
extraction theories.  However, for the subsample of CEOs who are dismissed, severance pay
appears to occur in patterns that match the predictions of several bonding theories as well as the
damage control theory, though the countervailing predictions of certain bonding theories make
interpretation of the results somewhat difficult.  Analysis of abnormal stock returns upon the
disclosure of separation packages reveals a negative and significant reaction in cases of
voluntary CEO retirements and an insignificant reaction in cases of forced CEO removal.  These
results are consistent with a prediction of the rent extraction theory.
Payouts to CEOs when they leave their posts indicate that turnover, whether planned or
forced, serves as a type of “compensation event” in which top managers can obtain extraordinary
one-time rewards on top of their regular annual pay.  The findings complement other recent
research into one-time rewards for CEOs who agree to sell their firms (Hartzell, Ofek and
Yermack, 2004), CEOs who change jobs (Fee and Hadlock, 2003), and CEOs who make4
acquisitions (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004).  Together these studies indicate that understanding top
management incentives requires looking beyond routine annual compensation and examining
one-time events, which might also include spinoffs, IPOs, equity carveouts, and even
bankruptcies or liability restructurings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews theoretical models
of separation pay for top managers.  Section 3 describes the data and sample selection.  Section 4
presents regression analysis of the value of separation packages.  Section 5 contains analysis of
stock market reactions to the disclosure of these pacts.  Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Theories of CEO separation pay
The passages below discuss four theories of severance pay: ex post settling up,
managerial rent extraction, bonding, and damage control.  The first two theories apply mainly to
voluntary CEO turnover, while the other two seem more relevant for involuntary dismissals.
A.  Ex post settling up
When a CEO concludes a successful career, the ex post settling up theory would predict a
lump-sum exit payment if the CEO had been underpaid during his career. Fama’s (1980)
intertemporal model of CEO wages serves as the foundation of this theory, under which a board
of directors continually obtains new information about a CEO’s human capital value, decoding
noisy signals sent via the company’s performance.  Changes to CEO compensation take account
of this new information period by period, through a wage smoothing dynamic that Fama labels
“ex post settling up.”  So long as the performance signal received by the board has uncertain5
precision, the board will not engage in full settling up with the manager period-by-period, but
instead will revise wages gradually over time as new signals are received.  Fama’s infinite-
horizon model does not deal explicitly with a CEO who reaches retirement, but a clear
implication is that a manager who retires after a successful career may receive a large exit
package, since his human capital contributions could have exceeded those perceived by the
board during his career (this will not be true of all retiring CEOs, since boards might realize ex
post that some had been overpaid).  The board could refuse to acknowledge an implicit ex post
settling up arrangement and deny a good CEO the exit package, but this would send adverse
signals to other managers in the organization including the successor CEO.
Empirically, ex post settling up predicts an inverse association between separation pay
and the extent to which a CEO is overcompensated, relative to the market value of his human
capital, in years leading up to retirement.  For dismissed CEOs, the expected level of separation
pay should be zero for ex post settling up purposes, since these CEOs’ ex post human capital
value likely fell below the level perceived ex ante by the board.  Importantly, an inverse
association between prior compensation and a CEO’s severance could exist for other reasons
than ex post settling up.  Some CEOs may enter into employment contracts assuring them of
large separation packages or work for firms with histories of awarding large severance pay. 
Holding all else constant, these CEOs should obtain reduced annual compensation as a tradeoff
for the security of a large prospective exit package.  The resulting coincidence of low annual
compensation and high separation pay would result from ex ante endogenous relations rather
than ex post settling up.6
B.  Rent extraction
In line with the frequent portrayal of separation agreements in the news media, a further
theory of severance pay is that it represents rent extraction by powerful managers who are able to
obtain extra compensation beyond the value of their human capital (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Fried,
2004).  The rent extraction theory of severance pay should apply only in cases of voluntary
turnover, since CEOs who are fired would appear to lack influence over their firms’ governance. 
The main empirical predictions of the theory would be a positive association between prior
annual excess compensation and the level of severance pay, since CEOs’ ability to obtain excess
compensation should be high at both the middle and the end of their careers, and a negative
association between severance pay and the quality of corporate governance.  In addition, the
theory suggests that severance pay should be delivered in a non-transparent form, since boards
might want to conceal from shareholders payments representing unearned economic rents.
C.  Bonding
When CEOs are dismissed for poor performance, separation payments might represent
payoffs of explicit or implicit contracts under which the firm provides insurance for the CEOs’
human capital value.  Models of severance pay in this framework appear in Berkovitch, Israel,
and Spiegel (2000), Ju, Leland, and Senbet (2002), Almazan and Suarez (2003), and Inderst and
Mueller (2005).  These papers generally analyze moral hazard or governance problems that arise
when CEOs alter their behavior because they fear dismissal.  These problems are related to
inadequate risk-taking, shirking, entrenchment in office, and incomplete disclosure of
information.  Risk taking is analyzed in all four papers as well as the CEO compensation7
literature generally.  With either a concave utility function and/or private benefits from his
position, the CEO may avoid investments that have a positive net present value but increase the
probability of adverse outcomes leading to dismissal.  Shirking may arise if a CEO feels that his
replacement has become likely, and that additional effort would do little to help him keep his
job; Berkovitch et. al (2000) analyze this case most closely.  CEO entrenchment, modeled by
Almazan and Suarez (2003) as an alternative rationale for severance pay that is distinct from
their examination of risk aversion, refers to the possibility that a CEO could be monitored by a
weak board of directors and elect to remain in his position and collect a stream of rents, though
shareholders would prefer that he be removed.  Incomplete disclosure, the focus of Inderst and
Mueller (2005), represents an alternative strategy for CEOs to remain in office and collect rents
by keeping shareholders unaware of negative information.
Severance pay in each model serves as a bonding device through which shareholders
promise the CEO a minimum income level while also raising the costs to themselves of changing
managers.  In cases of risk aversion or effort avoidance, CEOs would be more likely to pursue
value maximizing strategies due to the security provided by severance pay.  In cases of CEO
entrenchment, whether arising from weak governance or information asymmetry, severance pay
may make retirement more attractive to an under-performing CEO than staying in his position,
even if the board lacked the strength or accurate information that would cause it to remove him.
Individually or collectively, these models imply a number of empirical predictions, all of
which should apply more to CEO dismissals than to voluntary retirements.  Due to the range of
hypotheses presented in the various models, not all of these empirical predictions are
unambiguous and internally consistent, though they are not necessarily mutually exclusive8
either.  To serve as insurance for the CEO’s human capital value, severance pay should be
positively associated with the present value of expected future income until retirement, a
prediction that appears to be implied by all of the theory papers that study risk aversion except
Berkovitch et. al (2000).  Leverage should be negatively associated with severance pay,
according to the Berkovitch et. al model, since severance pay increases the costs to shareholders
of removing a CEO and risky debt does the opposite, if one assumes that CEO replacement
increases the variability of expectations about future cash flows.  However, one could also justify
a prediction of a positive association between leverage and severance pay based on the idea of
human capital insurance, since leverage puts a CEO at greater risk of removal, ceteris paribus. 
Almazan and Suarez’s (2003) model of CEO entrenchment predicts that severance pay should be
stronger when corporate governance quality is weaker and CEOs are more easily entrenched,
though an opposite prediction about governance quality would seem to apply to their model of
severance pay in the context of CEO risk aversion.  Finally, one would expect greater separation
packages for CEOs hired outside the firm, since these managers face greater uncertainty of
success due to lack of familiarity with the company and therefore should obtain greater insurance
for their human capital; Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino’s (2005) study of CEO employment
agreements shows a high incidence of formal contracts (which generally lead to severance pay
after dismissals) for CEOs hired from outside.
D.  Damage control
Most CEOs leave their posts with valuable corporate secrets as well as firm-specific
human capital that may be useful to the company in some form.  For this reason, separation3 Two well-known cases of retired CEOs assisting raiders in hostile takeover attempts are Lee Iacocca, who
cooperated with Kirk Kerkorian in his unsuccessful 1995 bid for Chrysler Corp., and J. Paul Sticht, who assisted
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts in its 1989 leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco Inc.
4 A number of prominent companies have in recent years become engaged in lawsuits with ex-CEOs after the
company dismissed them and then sought to limit or cancel certain aspects of their compensation.  Examples include
Richard Grasso and the New York Stock Exchange, Jean-Marie Messier and Vivendi Universal, Bernard Ebbers and
MCI, Albert Dunlap and Sunbeam, Conrad Black and Hollinger, and Stephen Hilbert and Conseco.
5 W.R. Grace & Co. and Sprint Corp. are representative examples of companies that negotiated generous
separation packages with dismissed CEOs under circumstances in which litigation would have been unsurprising.  In both
cases, the agreements included mutual liability releases.  At W.R. Grace, CEO J.P. Bolduc left in 1995 after a boardroom
power struggle with his predecessor, in which the two sides traded allegations of sexual harassment and financial
irregularities involving family members.  Bolduc, age 55, received a separation package valued at more than $20 million. 
At Sprint, CEO William T. Esrey, age 63, was ousted in 2003 after a 17 year tenure.  Esrey had followed the advice of
the company’s auditing firm and established a personal tax shelter that was challenged by the Internal Revenue Service. 
The CEO received a large bill for back taxes, and a public three-way conflict developed between the CEO, the auditors,
and the company.  Esrey received a separation package worth about $12.5 million.
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packages often pay the CEO for agreeing to a variety of non-competition, non-disclosure, non-
hire, and consulting provisions.  Severance pay may also prevent an ex-CEO from becoming an
adversary of the company, a role in which he might initiate litigation, sound off in the news
media, sabotage the transition to his successor, cooperate with regulatory investigations, or take
part in hostile takeover attempts.
3  Litigation by disgruntled ex-CEOs is perhaps the most
common of these problems, and its basis is usually not the dismissal event itself, but instead the
costs incurred by the CEO if the company abridges various compensation instruments, such as
unvested stock options, executive loans, deferred compensation, or pensions.
4  Separation
agreements therefore often require the ex-CEO to release the firm from any legal liability in
connection with his termination.
5  If severance pay helps limit costs related to litigation, adverse
publicity, information disclosure, and related problems, then a positive relation should exist
between severance pay and expected future compensation of dismissed CEOs, because lost
compensation represents the opportunity cost to these managers of termination.10
3. Sample selection and description
I analyze CEO turnover events in a panel of 237 companies that were members of the
Fortune 500 in 2002.  Beginning with the entire Fortune 500, I drop non-public firms and all
firms not covered by ExecuComp continuously from 1993 to 2002.  Because certain
computations below require three years of lagged compensation data, the sample for turnover
analysis spans the seven-year period 1996-2002, with 1993-95 data reserved for use as lagged
values.  The panel includes seven observations for each of 237 firms, or 1,659 company-years.
Table 1 describes construction of the sample of turnover events.  Within the panel,
companies change CEOs 211 times, including CEOs in the final sample year 2002 who are
replaced in 2003.  The departure frequency of 12.7 percent is slightly higher than in past
turnover studies but in line with a rising turnover trend over the past 40 years (see studies cited
by Denis and Denis, 1995).  Because this study focuses on CEO severance packages, I narrow
my sample by eliminating 32 observations for which separation pay is either irrelevant or
extraordinary, leaving 179 cases for analysis.  The 32 excluded observations include four cases
of death or ill health; four CEOs who left for better positions (three became CEOs elsewhere,
and one became U.S. Secretary of the Treasury); six acting CEOs who left after short tenures;
three CEOs who left amid scandals (one each for narcotics, sexual harassment, and fraud); 13
mergers or spinoffs in which the CEO’s exit was negotiated as an antecedent; one case in which
the CEO’s compensation information was undisclosed, in violation of SEC rules; and one CEO
demoted to a lower position.  I follow the standard approach of the CEO turnover literature by
partitioning the observations into “voluntary” and “forced” subsamples.  For the large majority
of observations, whether turnover is voluntary can be ascertained from news reports and/or11
language in company proxy statements.  In borderline cases, I also consider such factors as the
exiting CEO’s age and performance, his continuing role with the firm if any, time elapsed
between announcement of the CEO’s exit and his actual departure, and whether the successor
CEO came from outside the firm.  I classify 43 events, or 24.0 percent of the turnovers, as forced
with the remainder as voluntary.  This percentage is close to that found by Huson, Parrino and
Starks (2001), who classify 23.4 percent of turnover events as forced in a 1989-94 sample.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 179 turnover events, with the full
sample’s properties shown in the left column and data for voluntary and forced subsamples in the
other two columns.  Exiting CEOs have a mean age of 61 years with an average of ten years
service, and unsurprisingly, CEOs who leave voluntarily have significantly higher means for age
and service compared to CEOs who are forced out.  Dismissed CEOs are significantly less likely
to belong to the company’s founding family.  CEOs hired recently outside the firm comprise a
greater fraction of the forced compared to voluntary turnover observations, but the difference is
not significant.  CEOs own a mean of $532.7 million (median of $43.1 million) of stock plus
options in their firms, with option values calculated with Black-Scholes methods based upon
option inventories disclosed in proxy statements (the very high mean value of ownership is
largely due to a single observation, Bill Gates of Microsoft).  Median equity ownership is
significantly lower for CEOs whose departures are forced as opposed to voluntary, because the
accumulation of equity compensation is linked to tenure in office.
Annual compensation, equal to the sum of salary, bonus, and option and restricted stock
award values, has a mean of $8.1 million (median of $4.8 million) for CEOs in their last full year
prior to departure (CEOs who leave after less than two years in office are not counted in this12
calculation).  I estimate whether CEOs have been over- or under-compensated in the past relative
to their peers, as a prelude to tests of the ex post settling up and rent extraction theories.  I
estimate each CEO’s past excess compensation using the ExecuComp variable for three-year
compensation, for the period ending in the last full year prior to the turnover year (this year must
be omitted from the calculation because it may include the value of the separation package).  I
regress the log of each CEO’s three-year compensation against the log of sales, the firm’s three-
year net-of-market stock return compounded continuously, and dummy variables for two-digit
SIC industries and individual years.  The regression sample includes the latest observation for all
ExecuComp CEOs with at least three years tenure for whom the three-year compensation and
stock return variables are not missing.  The sample analyzed contains 2,087 observations, the
estimated regression has an r-squared of 0.456, and estimated coefficients are 0.41 for the log of
sales and 0.14 for the three-year stock return, both statistically significant.  For the 179 exiting
CEOs in my sample, 147 have enough information to appear in the regression sample.  From the
excess compensation regression, I save the expected values of the log of three-year
compensation and exponentiate them.  I then estimate prior excess compensation as the
difference between actual three-year compensation and the regression’s expected value.
About one-third of the CEOs in my sample have employment contracts at the time of
their exits, and this frequency is somewhat higher though not significantly different for CEOs
who are dismissed compared to those who retire voluntarily.  As shown in data below, the
existence of an employment contract is important for a departing CEO, because the company
must continue making payments for the duration of the contract or honor any severance clauses
if the CEO does not retire voluntarily.6 Both employment contracts and negotiated separation agreements with company officers are required to be
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as exhibits to the company’s Form 10-Q or 10-K that covers the
period in which the contract becomes effective, according to SEC Regulation S-K,17 CFR 229.601(a)(4) (see Instructions
to Exhibit Table, paragraph (10)(ii)(D)(iii)(A)).  The filing deadline for an agreement is therefore the same as the filing
deadline for the 10-Q or 10-K.  Of the 89 negotiated separation agreements in my sample, 42 were filed in a 10-K at
fiscal year-end and 39 were filed mid-year in a 10-Q.  The remaining eight contracts were filed ahead of disclosure
deadlines in either a Form 8-K (extraordinary events) or S-4 (registration statement).  The majority of contracts are filed
within several months after the CEO’s departure, although 20 of 89 agreements were filed in advance.  In seven cases in
which the ex-CEO remained for a period as Chairman of the Board, the separation agreements did not become effective
immediately and were not filed for more than a year after his departure as CEO.
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Exiting CEOs often enter into written separation agreements with their firms.  I search
SEC filings to obtain all such agreements, and I locate them for just under half of the sample
observations.
6  If no written agreement exists, I rely on disclosures in companies’ proxy
statements to provide information about the separation pay received by exiting CEOs (many are
covered by proxy disclosure rules for several years after leaving office, since they often continue
serving on the board of directors).  In cases in which no formal agreement is negotiated,
separation payments to the CEO can occur due to unilateral action by the board or its
compensation committee.  A large, unsurprising disparity exists in the frequency of formal
separation agreements for dismissed CEOs (74.4 percent) compared to voluntary retirements
(41.9 percent).
I track subsequent positions, if any, that exiting CEOs hold with their firms.  Of the 136
voluntary turnover cases, 99 former CEOs (nearly three-quarters) remain as Chairman of the
Board for at least a period of transition, while another 15 remain as directors.  Only 21 of 136
resign all their positions immediately.  In the subsample of 43 forced CEO turnovers, about two-
thirds, or 29 CEOs, leave all positions immediately, while 11 others become Chairman of the
Board for a nominal period.
Table 2 also tabulates various information about the size and governance of the sample14
firms included in the analysis.  No unusual patterns or significant differences exist for these
variables in the overall sample or in the forced vs. voluntary turnover subsamples.
A.  Contracted and discretionary separation pay
When a CEO works under an employment contract and is dismissed, in most cases the
contract specifies minimum separation pay either directly, in a special contract term, or
indirectly, since the CEO continues receiving compensation until the contract expires.  A CEO
who retires voluntarily in the middle of a contract generally is not entitled to severance unless
the board awards it discretionarily or the CEO negotiates to retain his status as an employee,
perhaps while serving as Chairman of the Board.  Employment contracts therefore affect the
amount of separation pay that a CEO receives and also its form of delivery.
An empirical study of CEO employment contracts appears in Gillan, Hartzell, and
Parrino (2005).  That study’s sample of S&P 500 firms, analyzed in 2000, overlaps considerably
with the sample for this paper.  The authors find that employment contracts are more common
when a CEO is young, when he has been hired outside the firm, when the board has a high
percentage of independent directors, when a predecessor CEO had been fired in the past five
years, when the firm competes in a non-homogenous industry, and when the firm’s stock has low
volatility.  Several of these relations, such as CEO age, board independence, and a past history of
CEO dismissals, suggest a positive association between the incidence of employment contracts
and the ex ante probability of CEO removal, though the volatility relation does not.
Table 3 tabulates the separation pay for CEOs in my sample, with observations
partitioned according to whether or not the CEO was working under an employment contract and15
whether turnover was voluntary or forced.  Data for the entire sample appear in the right column. 
I divide the total severance package for each subsample into two quantities, those that are
mandated by the employment contract (which equal zero by definition for the no-contract
subsamples), and those that are awarded discretionarily by the board.  Table 3 shows that CEOs
who leave voluntarily and have employment contracts rarely receive contracted severance pay (7
out of 43 observations).  Boards make discretionary separation payments of almost identical size
and frequency to voluntarily retiring CEOs who do and do not have employment contracts; 42
percent of those with contracts get additional separation pay with a mean value of $2.2 million,
while 44 percent of those without contracts get separation pay with a mean of $2.3 million.  The
overall mean separation package for voluntarily exiting CEOs is vastly lower than the mean for
dismissed CEOs, $2.3 million compared to $15.1 million.  For the entire sample, CEOs with
employment contracts receive the same mean separation pay as those without contracts – $5.4
million.  Only about 17 percent of separation pay is delivered pursuant to employment contracts,
and this statistic is only modestly higher, 24 percent, for the subsample of dismissed CEOs.
Data for forced CEOs turnover events presents several clear contrasts to the data for
voluntary turnover.  When a CEO is fired and has an employment contract, he receives a
contracted settlement in 17 out of 19 observations.  The mean contracted settlement to this
subgroup, including the two zero-valued observations, has a present value of $8.1 million
(median of $3.1 million)  Most of these CEOs (11 out of 19) also receive discretionary
separation pay, with a mean value of $3.9 million (median of $1.1 million), making their total
mean package worth $12.0 million.  Somewhat surprisingly, CEOs who are dismissed without an
employment contract do even better.  Nearly all of these CEOs (21 out of 24) receive7 Most CEO pensions are defined benefit life annuities.  For pension changes, I calculate the value impact as the
difference of actuarial life annuity values before and after the change.  Inputs to these calculations include the fixed
annual pension amount payable to the CEO, the CEO’s age, a discount rate, and forecast mortality probabilities.  A
CEO’s annual pension entitlement can be inferred from disclosures in firms’ proxy statements, though the process can
require significant research.  I use mortality data tabulated by the U.S. Social Security Administration.  The company’s
cost of debt, based upon its bond rating, serves as the discount rate.  See Sundaram and Yermack (2005) for further
details.  As an example, J.P. Morgan Chase CEO Walter Shipley retired in 1999 at age 63, and according to the
company’s 1999 proxy statement, he was entitled to a pension of $897,577 beginning at age 65 in a joint and 50%
survivor life annuity.  The next year, the 2000 proxy statement reported that Shipley had begun drawing a $1,600,000
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discretionary separation pay, with a mean value of $17.5 million (median of $6.0 million).
B.  Elements of discretionary CEO separation pay
I disaggregate data about discretionary separation pay into four categories.  Table 4
presents descriptive statistics about each category and the total values of packages received by
the 179 exiting CEOs in the sample, with the table again divided into sections for voluntary
turnover, forced turnover, and the entire sample.  The data show that about half of all CEOs, and
about three-quarters of CEOs who are dismissed, receive discretionary packages with positive
value, with significantly larger payments awarded to the forced turnover subsample.  Categories
of discretionary separation pay include:
• Lump-sum payments.  These can include cash, forgiveness of loans from the company,
and new awards of stock or options.  Rather than label these as “severance pay,” firms
generally characterize them euphemistically as consideration for such things as “effecting
a smooth transition to his successor,” “leadership in the management transition process,”
or the CEO’s “personal sacrifice of electing early retirement.”
• Consulting and non-compete agreements.  Many companies enter into contracts that will
be paid out over a number of years, in consideration for the exiting CEO’s agreement not
to compete against the company and/or to serve as a consultant.  I take the present value
of these payments, discounted at the firm’s cost of debt as inferred from its bond rating.
• Pension augmentations.  Some companies adjust the terms of CEOs’ lifetime defined
benefit pensions.  Pension benefits often depend upon length of service, and some firms
add extra service time or permit CEOs to begin drawing full pensions earlier than the
normal age (usually 65).  Value consequences of these changes are usually opaque.
7annual pension at age 64 in a joint and 100% survivor life annuity.  These three adjustments -- increasing the annual
amount, changing the survivor payout from 50% to 100%, and beginning payments one year earlier -- increased its
actuarial value by more than $7.5 million, assuming that Shipley had a wife the same age as him.  The company gave no
explanation for the changes, nor did it disclose their value consequences.
8 Each firm’s default treatment of equity compensation for exiting employees appears in the documents
associated with its executive compensation plans, which are filed as attachments to company proxy statements or Forms
10-K or 10-Q.  Stock options and restricted shares that have not yet vested are generally forfeited when an executive
leaves the firm, unless he has attained a minimum retirement age such as 55 or 60.  If he has reached retirement age, the
executive retains his shares or options, and some companies also allow unvested equity awards to vest.  The remaining
exercise period for stock options under these conditions will generally be truncated.  For CEOs in my sample, I observe a
variety of deviations from companies’ standard policies, including waiver of forfeiture rules, more generous vesting than
usual, and longer exercise periods.  I compare the treatment of each CEO’s equity compensation to the company’s
standard policies, and I calculate the resulting value impact for each CEO.  For stock options, these calculations involve
Black-Scholes valuations before and after any adjustments of their terms.  For restricted stock, calculations involve
multiplying the number of shares that the CEO obtains extraordinarily by the stock price on his date of exit.  Within the
sample, maximum values of these adjustments are extremely large, as two dismissed CEOs obtain more than $100
million.  In both cases the CEOs were younger than the company’s standard retirement age for retaining equity awards
but were nevertheless permitted to keep millions of unvested shares and/or options.  Minimum sample values are below
zero, as a few CEO separation agreements call for shortening option lives even more than under ordinary circumstances. 
Some CEOs’ employment contracts include pre-negotiated terms for the treatment of equity compensation if the CEO
leaves the firm.  In these cases I compare the contracted terms to the company’s default policies, and the value of any
benefit for the CEO counts as part of his contractual separation pay.  Any further change in the treatment of the CEO’s
equity awards, when compared to the contracted terms, is counted as discretionary separation pay.
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• Adjustments to equity compensation.  Most exiting CEOs hold unvested stock options
and restricted shares.  All companies have policies for how to treat these awards when
executives leave the company, and in some cases, the company deviates from its standard
policies in ways that add considerable value to a CEO’s holdings.
8
I do not take account of compensation that some ex-CEOs receive for subsequent service
on the board.  Often exiting CEOs remain as Chairman of the Board, even in some cases of
forced turnover, and their compensation may remain at the CEO level for at least one to two
years.  It is not clear whether this remuneration should be viewed as disguised severance pay or
whether the former CEO is genuinely earning additional pay for duties performed as Chairman;
the sample probably includes observations of both types.  Also, many exiting CEOs obtain fringe
benefits in retirement such as country club memberships, automobiles, office space, premium
health coverage, personal security, and so forth.  One CEO in my sample negotiated for
continued control over his company’s box seats at the U.S. Open tennis championships, and no9 For example, when Bank One Corp. announced CEO John B. McCoy’s departure on December 22, 1999, the
company’s stock rose more than 10 percent.  McCoy’s personally owned shares and options increased in value by more
than $3 million as a result.  McCoy, age 57, left the company completely, not remaining as a director.  His separation
package was unusually large compared to others in the sample, as it included a $10.3 million lump-sum payment; a
pension increase with an actuarial value exceeding $15 million; office space and secretarial support for life; moving
expenses; and a reimbursement for any loss on the sale of his residence.  The company wrote in its 2002 proxy statement
that the board’s compensation committee was “satisfied as to the appropriateness of the terms of [McCoy’s] agreement,”
but Bank One’s stock fell by a market-adjusted 1.61 percent upon its disclosure.
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less than 16 exiting CEOs, all of them cases of voluntary turnover, received access to company
aircraft for personal travel for periods ranging from five years to life.  I do not include these
perks in my calculations due to the difficulty of valuing them.
Finally, I do not include gains or losses to a CEO when the firm’s stock price reacts to
the announcement of his departure.  In some cases of forced turnover, company stock prices rise
substantially, giving the exiting CEO consolation of a large appreciation in his equity holdings.
9
4. Regression analysis of separation pay
I analyze whether CEO separation packages conform to the theories of severance pay
detailed above.  Since separate theories predict patterns of separation pay for voluntary and
forced CEO turnover, I estimate separate regressions for these two subsamples.  Because of the
large number of zero-valued separation packages, I estimate Tobit regressions, and the
dependent variable for each regression equals the total value of each CEO’s separation package.
The key explanatory variables in the regressions are related to each ex-CEO’s
compensation and career concerns as well as the firm’s financial and governance structure.  For
voluntary turnover, the ex post settling up paradigm predicts an inverse association between a
CEO’s separation package and the extent to which he was paid during his career at above-market
levels.  An opposite, positive prediction between severance pay and prior compensation is10 The Gompers-Ishii-Metrick index is a count variable measuring the incidence of 24 separate takeover
defenses and other anti-shareholder rights provisions, some of which arise under various state laws and others of which
are due to corporate charters or bylaws.  The index has come into wide use as an empirical proxy for the quality of a
firm’s corporate governance.  However, a separate literature has begun to question the efficacy of the index as a measure
of governance; see Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) and Brown and Caylor (2004).
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implied by the rent extraction theory.  I therefore include a variable estimating the CEO’s
compensation over the prior three years, calculated according to methods discussed above.  For
CEOs with less than three years tenure (32 observations out of 179), I assume that this variable
equals zero; this assumption is probably reasonable since CEOs whose compensation is out of
line with market practices typically have served long tenures in office.
For forced turnover, various bonding hypotheses suggest that separation pay should
exhibit a positive association with CEO age, since age should be related to the lifetime stream of
earnings that a CEO would expect had he worked until normal retirement.  The damage control
theory implies a similar prediction of a positive association between severance and age.  I
therefore include a variable measuring the CEO’s expected years to retirement, equal to the
difference between 65 and the CEO’s age or zero for all CEOs age 65 and older.  Certain
bonding theories also expect associations between severance and the firm’s financial leverage
(negative), its quality of corporate governance (either positive or negative, according to the two
cases studied by Almazan and Suarez (2003)), and whether the CEO was hired recently outside
the firm (positive).  I include measures of these three variables: for leverage I use total debt over
total assets, for corporate governance I use the anti-shareholder rights index of Gompers, Ishii
and Metrick (2003),
10 and I set an indicator variable equal to 1 for CEOs hired outside the firm in
the past five years.  Note that higher values of the index imply weaker governance, since it
counts the number of a firm’s takeover defenses and related provisions.  Because the data source,20
the Investor Responsibility Research Center, generally reports the variable in intervals three or
four years apart, I use the value closest in time to each observation.  The governance index is
also used to test the damage control theory, which predicts a negative association between
governance quality and separation pay.  This prediction is based upon a conjecture that poorly
governed firms are more vulnerable to disclosures of damaging information than well governed
firms.  However, the opposite prediction could also be supported.  The governance index mainly
measures the strength of a firm’s takeover defenses, and a company at low risk of takeover may
feel a diminished need to use severance pay to deter an ex-CEO from participating in a hostile
raid.  Regressions also include the log of total assets to control for firm size, and year and
industry dummy variables.  Due to the relatively small number of observations, industry
dummies are measured at the one-digit SIC level.
Regression estimations appear in Table 5.  On the left of the table, estimates within the
subsample of voluntary CEO turnover observations show no significant associations with any
key explanatory variables, and the pseudo r
2 statistic is far lower than for the estimation with
forced turnover observations on the right.  The absence of significant associations for the
voluntary turnover observations provides no evidence in support of the ex post settling up or rent
extraction theories.  However, the ex post settling up and rent extraction theories generate
opposite predictions for the sign of the excess compensation variable’s estimate.  Since these two
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, it is possible that each influences the data significantly
but in an offsetting pattern that makes their joint effect appear to be zero.
Regression estimates for the subsample of forced turnover observations exhibit a contrast
to those for voluntary turnover, as the leverage, governance, and years to expected retirement21
coefficient estimates all have expected signs and are statistically significant, though the leverage
and governance variables could arguably be expected have either a positive or negative
estimates.  All three of these estimates support certain models of separation pay as a bonding
device between the CEO and shareholders.  Only the coefficient for the dummy variable for
CEOs hired recently outside the firm, which bonding theories might predict to have a positive
estimate, fails to match the prediction of the theory.  The positive and significant estimate for
years until expected retirement also supports the damage control theory, since this variable is
used as a proxy for a CEO’s expected income over the remaining years of his career.
I test robustness of the regression results in several ways.  First, I delete two outlier
forced turnover observations whose severance packages exceed $100 million.  All estimates
retain their sign and significance except the coefficient for leverage, which moves closer to zero
and sees its t-statistic change to -1.07.  For years until expected retirement and the governance
index, t-statistics increase after deletion of the two outliers to 2.44 and 2.56, respectively.  As a
further sensitivity test, I truncate the dependent variable from its previous specification as the
total CEO separation package value, and redefine it is the non-contracted, discretionary value. 
The subsample of voluntary turnover observations continues to exhibit no significant coefficient
estimates for the key variables.  Among the forced turnover observations, two variables no
longer have significant estimates – years to expected retirement and the governance index –
though the estimate for the leverage variable remains significant.  These estimates indicate that
pre-contracted severance pay helps importantly to influence the overall severance package in the
directions prediction by theory.  A final robustness test involves deleting from both samples the
32 CEOs with less than three years service prior to the turnover year.  The rationale for dropping22
these observations is related to the estimation of excess compensation, which requires three years
of lagged data and is assumed to equal zero in the regressions shown in Table 5.  Dropping these
observations may reduce the measurement error in the excess compensation variable and change
its coefficient estimate.  However, I find no such effect, as the variable’s estimate remains
insignificant and quite close to zero in both subsamples.  Other coefficient estimates do not vary
meaningfully, except that the years to expected retirement coefficient loses its significant
estimate in the forced turnover subsample; this may occur because the deleted observations tend
to be the youngest CEOs in the sample.
Under the rent extraction theory, I expect that as severance packages grow larger, firms
may disclose them less transparently.  I investigate this conjecture in a regression model using
the subsample of observations in which the separation package has positive value for
discretionary pay.  The dependent variable is an “opacity index,” equal to the present value of a
CEO’s pension enhancements, plus the value of adjustments to equity compensation, divided by
the total value of his discretionary separation package.  This index, which I compound
continuously, takes a value between zero and one, and higher values occur when the values of
CEO separation agreements are more difficult to ascertain.  However, a high value of the index
might also occur when stock- or pension-based pay appears advantageous to for reasons other
than reducing costs of disclosure; income tax reduction, smoothing accounting earnings, or the
firm’s liquidity may also deter the company from delivering separation pay in cash.  The key
explanatory variable is the size of the CEO’s incremental separation pay compared to its
predicted level.  This difference is assumed to be the residual from the Tobit regression model in
Table 5, estimated over the full sample and augmented by a dummy variable for forced turnover23
observations (results are insensitive to using instead the separate residuals from the two
subsample regressions in Table 5).  Control variables include return on assets, since profitable
firms may be less reluctant to report high compensation, and dummy variables for years and one-
digit SIC indicators.  The regression estimates, which are untabulated in order to save space,
indicate that a significantly negative association exists between the transparency of a CEO’s
separation package and the extent to which a package is larger than expected (the result is robust
and somewhat stronger if the model is estimated for voluntary turnover observations only).  In
addition, packages for dismissed CEOs have significantly less transparency than packages for
voluntarily retired CEOs.  Together, these findings provide mixed support for the rent extraction
theory of separation pay.  Under this theory, it is not surprising that larger packages are delivered
in a non-transparent form, but it is unexpected to find the least transparent packages being
awarded to CEOs who are dismissed.
5. Stock returns upon disclosure of separation packages
I evaluate shareholder reactions to CEO separation agreements by calculating abnormal
stock returns for dates of disclosure of these packages for the 179 CEOs in the sample.  It is not
clear ex ante whether shareholders should view severance payments positively or negatively. 
Under the ex post settling up theory, for example, a large separation package might indicate that
the CEO had performed better than previously understood, which would be good news for
shareholders.  Alternatively, a high package for a mediocre CEO might signal that the board had
little skill at evaluating managers, which would be bad news.  The various bonding theories of
severance pay yield similarly ambiguous predictions.  Severance pay may indicate that the CEO24
had made positive NPV investments that didn’t work out, which would perhaps convey positive
information about the firm’s governance.  Alternatively, severance pay may indicate that the
CEO possessed adverse inside information about the firm’s governance quality or its future
performance and elected to resign because he forecast low future compensation for himself. 
Under the damage control theory, the expected reaction of shareholders to separation pay is also
ambiguous.  Severance packages could be positive news for shareholders, indicating that the
firm had acted to limit certain costs that might have been high.  However, they could also
indicate possible problems within the firm and therefore send an adverse signal.  Only the rent
extraction theory seems to yield a clear prediction, that severance pay should result in negative
stock returns, since its disclosure would indicate that the firm’s governance was too ineffective
to prevent expropriation of rents by management.  Even if shareholders had believed governance
to be poor, payment of large severance might resolve uncertainty about such beliefs.  
In my event study analysis, the event date is the earliest of (i) the proxy statement filing
describing the terms of the CEO’s separation, (ii) the Form 10-K, 10-Q, or other filing in which a
negotiated separation agreement is included as an exhibit, or (iii) the date on which a company
news release publicizes details of the CEO’s exit package.  For CEOs receiving zero separation
pay, the event date is the first proxy statement filed after the year of their departure, the latest
point at which any separation package would ordinarily be disclosed.  I drop five events in which
the CEO’s dismissal is announced simultaneously with his separation package.  Abnormal stock
returns are calculated over an interval beginning four trading days prior to the event day and
ending one trading day after, using standard market model methods with the CRSP value-
weighted index as the market portfolio.  Results below are generally insensitive to reasonable25
variations in the estimation procedure.  Abnormal stock returns at the disclosure of separation
packages are nearly orthogonal to the abnormal returns at the announcement of CEOs’
departures, with a correlation coefficient of -0.037.
Results in Table 6 indicate that shareholders have negative overall reactions to
disclosures of CEO severance packages.  Abnormal returns have mean and median values
slightly less than -1.0%, with statistical significance at the 7 percent level (mean) or 12 percent
level (median).  If the sample is restricted to the 88 CEOs whose discretionary separation pay
has positive value, mean and median abnormal returns remain negative but move closer to zero
and are insignificant.  The middle two columns in Table 6 illustrate market reactions in cases of
planned and forced turnover.  Planned turnover agreements are accompanied by stock returns
more negative than those for the overall sample and are statistically significant below the 2
percent level.  In contrast, agreements in cases of forced turnover are accompanied by abnormal
stock returns that are positive and insignificant.  This pattern of results provides some evidence
in support of the rent extraction theory of severance pay, which predicts negative returns at the
disclosure of severance pacts in cases of voluntary CEO turnover.
6. Conclusions
This paper studies separation payments to CEOs when leaving their firms, compensation
commonly known as “golden handshakes.”  Just over half of exiting CEOs in my sample from
Fortune 500 firms receive separation pay, with a mean value of $5.4 million.  The majority of
separation pay is awarded by boards of directors discretionarily, rather than under employment
contracts, and CEO dismissals generally lead to larger packages than voluntary retirements.26
I discuss and evaluate theories for why firms award severance pay, including ex post
settling up, bonding, damage control, and rent extraction.  No results in the paper clearly support
the ex post settling up theory despite its economic appeal.  Regression analysis supports certain
predictions of bonding theories in cases of forced CEO turnover, with CEOs receiving pay in
proportion to expected years to future retirement and in negative association with leverage and
governance quality (the leverage result is not robust to deletion of outliers).  The association of
severance pay with expected years to retirement also supports the damage control theory. 
Theories related to rent extraction fail to receive support from the regression analysis but are
consistent with negative stock market reactions to the disclosure of separation packages in cases
of voluntary turnover, as well as an apparent association between the transparency of separation
packages and their size compared to expected value.
Several results appear to support an ad hoc interpretation that boards use severance pay
to assure CEOs of a minimum lifetime wage level.  CEOs who retire voluntarily receive less
severance than CEOs who are forced out, perhaps because the former will continue to obtain
benefits from board service and will probably retire with higher values of accumulated equity
compensation.  In cases of forced turnover, younger CEOs, for whom the costs of dismissal are
higher, get more severance than older CEOs who are forced out, and the overall value of
separation pay generally seems unrelated to whether a CEO had an employment contract.  All of
these patterns suggest that certain norms of equity or fairness influence firms’ decisions about
how to compensate exiting CEOs, without clear attention to any theory of economic
optimization.27
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Table 1
Sample selection
Sample selection procedure for observations used in a study of CEO separation agreements.  The
candidate sample includes seven annual observations for each of 237 Fortune 500 firms that
were public continuously between 1996 and 2002 and are covered by ExecuComp.  Certain CEO
turnover events are excluded from the analysis for extraordinary reasons listed in the table. 
Excluded events either did not require the board to decide about the terms of the CEO’s
separation, or involved significant external considerations in conjunction with the CEO turnover. 
Voluntary and forced turnover events are identified mainly from news reports and language in
company proxy statements.
Total sample: 237 firms x 7 years 1,659 candidate observations
CEO turnover events 211 12.7% of sample
Events excluded from analysis
Succession agreements in mergers
Acting CEOs
Resigned to take better position
Death or poor health
Resigned in connection with spinoff
Cause (fraud, drugs, sexual harassment)
Demoted to lower position


















Descriptive statistics for a sample of 179 CEOs who left their positions in Fortune 500 firms
between 1996 and 2002.  Prior year compensation includes salary, bonus, option awards, and
restricted stock awards; and this variable is missing on the ExecuComp database for nine CEOs. 
The value of shares and options is computed at the end of the year prior to the CEO’s departure. 
All stock option values are computed according to the Black-Scholes method.  Three-year excess
compensation is based upon the residual from a regression of the log of compensation against the
log of firm size, three-year stock return net of market, and industry and year dummy variables;
this variable is missing for 32 CEOs with less than three years tenure.  Financial data is obtained
from ExecuComp, and the anti-shareholder rights index is obtained from the Investor
Responsibility Research Center, based on the method of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).
Observations
Age of exiting CEO
Years tenure in office
Member of company’s founding family
External hire, within past five years
Working under employment contract
Negotiated separation agreement filed
Value of shares and options (millions)
Value of shares and options
Compensation in prior year (millions)
Compensation in prior year





































































































Differences in right two columns are significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels, according to T-tests (means)
and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (identical distributions).31
Table 3
Contracted and discretionary CEO separation payments
Descriptive statistics for compensation paid to CEOs of 179 Fortune 500 companies who left their
positions between 1996 and 2002.  Data are tabulated according to whether the CEO had been working
under an employment contract.  All values are in millions, and when payments are spread over time, data
reflect present values discounted at the company’s cost of debt.  Information is obtained from each












































































































Elements of CEO separation payments
Descriptive statistics for compensation paid to CEOs of 179 Fortune 500 companies who left
their positions between 1996 and 2002.  All values are in millions, and when payments are
spread over time, data reflect present values discounted at the company’s cost of debt.  Equity
compensation adjustments reflect increases in stock option and restricted stock values due to
changes in award maturities or vesting conditions, with all option values computed according to
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   $36.1
$121.1
Differences in top two panels are significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels, according to T-tests (means) and
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (identical distributions).33
Table 5
Regression estimates of separation pay
Tobit estimates of the total value of separation pay for 179 Fortune 500 CEOs who left their
positions between 1996 and 2002.  Excess compensation is estimated over the three years prior
to CEO turnover based upon the residual from a standard compensation regression model and is
set equal to zero for all CEOs with less than three years service.  Expected years to retirement
equals the greater of zero and 65 minus the CEO’s age.  The indicator for recent outside hire
equals 1 if the exiting CEO was hired from outside the firm within the past five years.  The anti-
shareholder rights index is based on the method of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  Pseudo
r
2 is calculated according to Veall and Zimmermann (1994).  Compensation variables are
measured in millions of dollars, and firm size is measured in billions.
Voluntary turnover sample Forced turnover sample
Variable
Excess prior compensation
Expected years to retirement
Recent outside hire indicator
Leverage (debt / total assets)
Anti-shareholder rights index


























































Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels.34
Table 6
Abnormal stock returns at announcement of separation packages
Mean cumulative abnormal stock returns around the disclosure of separation packages for a
sample of 179 exiting CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1996 and 2002.  Abnormal
returns are calculated for an event window beginning four days prior to the disclosure date and
ending one day after, using standard market model methodology.  Disclosure dates occur when a
company makes an SEC filing that describes details of the CEO’s package, or, in a small number
of cases, by making a public news announcement.  The top rows of the table include data for the
entire sample, excluding five disclosure events that took place simultaneously with the
announcement of the CEO’s dismissal.  The bottom rows omit observations for exiting CEOs
who received zero discretionary separation payments.  For CEOs receiving zero payments, the
event date is the first proxy statement filing after the CEO leaves office.
All CEOs
Observations
Mean cumulative abnormal return







































CEOs with discretionary payments
Observations
Mean cumulative abnormal return



























Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels, based upon T-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum and signed-rank
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